

The challenge for embedded system in Automotive industry and BOSCH's count measure



ESCRYPT – Embedded Security

Company Profile



ESCRYPT GmbH

Foundation :	2004
Shareholder:	100% ETAS GmbH
Headquarter:	Bochum, Germany
Turnover 2014:	5.800 k €
Employees:	100 security experts world-wide
Management:	Martin Ridder, Dr. Thomas Wollinger

Portfolio

ESCRYPT provides a variety of products and services suited to protect devices and applications, to secure the back-end infrastructure, and to protect business models.

ESCRYPT's products are applicable to all industries with a need for embedded security.

- Security consulting and services
- Security products
- Customized security solutions
- Supporting Infrastructures

Europe	Asia-Pacific	America
Locations	Locations	Location

Germany (Berlin, Bochum, Munich, Stuttgart, Wolfsburg), UK (York), Sweden (Lund)

Locations
China (Shanghai), Japan
(Yokohama), Korea (Seoul), Indian
(Bangalore)

USA (Ann Arbor),

Canada(Waterloo)

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ESCRYPT – Executive Summary

Bosch at a glance

Bosch Group (2014)

- → 48,9 billion euros in sales
- → 290,000 associates
- → 360,000 associates as per April 1.15*






Automotive Security Solution

Security Analyses & Evaluation Scope





Accident prevention, i.e., protection against random failures (e.g., overvoltage) not caused by any (external) systematic forces/entities **Attack prevention**, i.e., protection against systematic (malicious) encroachments and manipulations (e.g., malware, hacker)

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ESCRYPT – Executive Summary

Internal: Bosch Center of Competence Security (Supported by ESCRYPT)

CoC Security - Participating Bosch Units

Mission:

The Center of Competence is responsible for the Governance function for Product Security within Bosch. It holds the core competence in security, technical data protection and cryptography. It is the guardian for Product Security.


Activities:

The CoC governance function for product security includes:

- Integration of security into Bosch development processes
- Security standardization support
- Security activities of cross-divisional interest
- Compilation of training material
- Maintenance of a Bosch-wide security knowledge base
- Being first contact in security-related issues

Service:

Beyond its governance function, the CoC Security provides security services to product divisions to fulfil their security requirements.



ESCRYPT – Executive Summary

External: Independent security supplier

- The leading provider of automotive security solutions:
 - Security consulting and services
 - Security products
 - Security developments tailored for specific industries
- Consulting for development and organizational processes
- Security solutions for individual ECU and in-vehicle network
- Security protection for the connected vehicles
- Security analysis skills together with strong research





December 10, 2016

ESCRYPT – Embedded Security

Reference Customers






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Automotive Security Solution

Security Analyses & Evaluation Scope






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ESCRYPT – Embedded Security The Solution: ESCRYPT's Holistic Approach






ESCRYPT – Embedded Security

Security for the Entire Life Cycle






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ESCRYPT – Embedded Security The Solution: ESCRYPT's Holistic Approach



Security and E/E - Layered Architecture




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ESCRYPT – Embedded Security

The Solution: ESCRYPT's Approach






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ESCRYPT – Embedded Security The Solution: ESCRYPT's Approach





E/E Architecture: Secure Communication


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


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
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Full Vehicle

Attack example



Architecture: 2015 Miller/Valasek* Hack Structure



Main security challenges to China OEMs


- Various inter-connection vehicle application with remote connection and remote control.
- Limited security protection for key assets.
- State of art security events and count measures, such as Chrysler Jeep remote attack, SAE J3061...

Security Concerns in Automobiles



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Main security requirements from China customers:

- 1. Security knowledge importing
- 2. Security analysis and solution definition
- 3. Security process compliance
- 4. Security component development and introduction
- 5. Security testing
- 6. Backend security solution

ESCRYPT solutions:

1. Security knowledge importing

Organizational trainings:

- 1. Fundamentals of Security Engineering and SDL
- 2. Security trends and attack
- 3. Establishing security for components and systems based on cryptography
- 4. Requirements for developing secure embedded systems
- 5. Secure system design and secure architecture

Professional trainings:

- 1. Introduction to cryptography and IT-security
- 2. Automotive HSM (Hardware Security Module)
- 3. SHE (Secure Hardware Extensions)
- 4. Key management system
- 5. Flash over the air

Security training list

Day 1	Automotive Security Basics	Day 3	Trends & Automotive Security, Software
АМ	Fundamentals of Security Engineering and SDL / Holistic security Design of		Trends & Attacks
АМ	Systems		Automotive security: threats and trends
	Introduction to cryptography		State-of-the-Art in Automotive Hacking
	Symmetric key cryptography		Automotive Security, Software
	Hash functions	PM	Secure Diagnostic Interface
PM	Public key cryptography		Secure in-vehicle communication
	Certificates and PKI	Day 4	Automotive Security, Hardware
	Security Certification		Introduction to Automotive HSMs and the Bosch HSM
	 Introduction to security in the IT industry 	PM	Secure Hardware Extension, SHE and SHE+
Day 2	Secure System Design and Secure Architecture	PM	 Application SW integration, CycurHSM & AUTOSAR CSM
	Secure Design Lifecycle 1	Day 5	Firewall, Software updates & Connectivity
	System Modeling		Application SW integration, CycurHSM & AUTOSAR CSM cont.
АМ	Security Objectives and Threat Analysis		Software Updates over-the-air
	Risk Assessment	DM	Key management
	Security Requirements	PM	Connectivity
	Security Concept		Car-to-car communications
	Secure Design Lifecycle 2		
	Security testing		
PM	Test Tools for Security functionality		
	Security Evaluation		
	Supplier Audit		

ESCRYPT solutions:

2. Security analysis and solution definition

- Provided E/E architecture consulting
- Analyzed the network planned by the OEM
- Security threat and risk analysis
- Security concept development
- Proposed improvements
- Proposed firewall rules

Security thread and risk analysis (Security asset and **Attack tree)** Confidentiality of EEPROM data Physical attacks on Attacks on ECU Attack on Runtime Organizational, e.g. ECU Environment of ECU attack on data communication Online manipulation Tampering with Eavesdropping Chip diagnostic session software/malware Read-out via Debug Replacement of ECU Weak access control software interface Misuse of other Overcome services Weak authentication

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Security thread and risk analysis (Risk assessment)

AP↓	Probability reference	Risk assessment									
Basic	Certain	Undesirable	Inacceptable	Inacceptable	Inacceptable						
Enhanced Basic	Likely	Tolerable	Undesirable	Inacceptable	Inacceptable						
Moderate	Possibly	Tolerable	Undesirable	Undesirable	Inacceptable						
High	Unlikely	Negligible	Tolerable	Undesirable	Undesirable						
Payand High	Rare	Negligible	Negligible	Tolerable	Tolerable						
Beyond High	Practically infeasible	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible						
DP →		Insignificant	Medium	Critical	Catastrophic						

Security thread and risk analysis

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Acronyms


distribution, as well as in the event of applications for industrial property rights.

Security mechanism list for reference

- 1. Secure boot loader
- 2. Digital signature for key data
- 3. MAC protection for CAN message
- 4. HSM protection (or trust zone solution)
- 5. Key Management solution
- 6. Cryptography
- 7. Access control
- 8. Memory protection
- 9. Debugger interface and backdoor...

- 4. Security process compliance
 - Security Engineering Process detailed deployment consulting
 - Security process tailoring
 - Security activity support
 - Security gateway review
 - Security audit support

Security thread and risk analysis (Overview)



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ESCRYPT solutions:

5. Security component development and introduction




ESCRYPT solutions:

6. Security penetration testing


In order to improve quality, trust, and dependability of such a embedded system, usually additional test methods that are designed **from an attacker's point of view** are needed since:

- Practical implementation can deviate from specification
- Fatal implementation errors can lead to security weaknesses
- Physical implementation can introduce additional security risks



ESCRYPT solutions:

- 7. Backend security solution
 - Key management solution(KMS) for OEMs and Tire1s
 - Flash over the air (FOTA)



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Thank you for your kind attention!

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