

The challenge for embedded system in Automotive industry and BOSCH's count measure



ESCRYPT – Embedded Security

Company Profile



ESCRYPT GmbH

Foundation:	2004
Shareholder:	100% ETAS GmbH
Headquarter:	Bochum, Germany
Turnover 2014:	5.800 k €
Employees:	100 security experts world-wide
Management:	Martin Ridder, Dr. Thomas Wollinger

Portfolio

ESCRYPT provides a variety of products and services suited to protect devices and applications, to secure the back-end infrastructure, and to protect business models.

ESCRYPT's products are applicable to all industries with a need for embedded security.

- ✓ **Security consulting and services**
- ✓ **Security products**
- ✓ **Customized security solutions**
- ✓ **Supporting Infrastructures**

Europe



Locations

Germany (Berlin, Bochum, Munich, Stuttgart, Wolfsburg), UK (York), Sweden (Lund)

Asia-Pacific



Locations

China (Shanghai), Japan (Yokohama), Korea (Seoul), Indian (Bangalore)

America



Location


USA (Ann Arbor), Canada (Waterloo)

ESCRYPT – Executive Summary

Bosch at a glance


Bosch Group (2014)

- 48,9 billion euros in sales
- 290,000 associates
- 360,000 associates as per April 1.15*



Automotive Security Solution

Security Analyses & Evaluation Scope



Accident prevention, i.e., protection against random failures (e.g., overvoltage) not caused by any (external) systematic forces/entities

Attack prevention, i.e., protection against systematic (malicious) encroachments and manipulations (e.g., malware, hacker)

ESCRYPT – Executive Summary

Internal: Bosch Center of Competence Security (Supported by ESCRYPT)

Mission:

The Center of Competence is responsible for the Governance function for Product Security within Bosch. It holds the core competence in security, technical data protection and cryptography. It is the guardian for Product Security.


Activities:

- The CoC governance function for product security includes:
- Integration of security into Bosch development processes
 - Security standardization support
 - Security activities of cross-divisional interest
 - Compilation of training material
 - Maintenance of a Bosch-wide security knowledge base
 - Being first contact in security-related issues

Service:

Beyond its governance function, the CoC Security provides security services to product divisions to fulfil their security requirements.

CoC Security - Participating Bosch Units



ESCRYPT – Executive Summary

External: Independent security supplier

- The leading provider of automotive security solutions:
 - Security consulting and services
 - Security products
 - Security developments tailored for specific industries
- Consulting for development and organizational processes
- Security solutions for individual ECU and in-vehicle network
- Security protection for the connected vehicles
- Security analysis skills together with strong research




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Reference Customers



Automotive Security Solution

Security Analyses & Evaluation Scope




ESCRYPT – Embedded Security

The Solution: ESCRYPT's Holistic Approach




ESCRYPT – Embedded Security

Security for the Entire Life Cycle




Security and E/E - Layered Architecture



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The Solution: ESCRYPT's Approach


E/E Architecture: HSM



ESCRYPT – Embedded Security

The Solution: ESCRYPT's Approach


E/E Architecture: Secure Communication



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The Solution: ESCRYPT's Approach


E/E Architecture: Gateways




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The Solution: ESCRYPT's Approach

E/E Architecture: Firewalls



Architecture: 2015 Miller/Valasek* Hack Structure



Course of the Attack:

1. Identify target over Mobile NW
2. Exploit ARM Core of HU
3. Control Infotainment System
4. Flash V850 Firmware and get access to internal CAN
5. Perform cyber physical actions

ESCRYPT – System Provider

Main security challenges to China OEMs

- Various inter-connection vehicle application with remote connection and remote control.
- Limited security protection for key assets.
- State of art security events and count measures, such as Chrysler Jeep remote attack, SAE J3061...

Security Concerns in Automobiles

“Hackers remotely kill Jeep on the Highway – with me in it” (Wired, July 2015)

“Senator Markey’s Report” (www.markey.senate.gov, Feb 2015)
Commitment of Automakers to Security and Privacy unclear

“Stanley Group Lawsuit” (www.stanleyiola.com, Mar 2015)
Toyota, Ford, GM misled their customers on security measures and hence safety of their vehicles


“Car Hacking: Remote access and other security Issues” (Computer World, Aug 2012)
A disgruntled former employee of Texas Auto Center hacked into company’s computers and remotely activated the vehicle Immobilization system, which triggered the horn and disabled the ignition system in more than 100 vehicles...

“This Car Safety Tool 'Could Have Given Hackers Control Of Your Vehicle'” (Forbes, Nov 2014)

“Researchers Show How a Car’s Electronics Can Be Taken Over Remotely” (New York Times, Aug 2011)




SURFACE VEHICLE RECOMMENDED PRACTICE	J3061™	JAN2016
	Issued	2016-01
Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems		



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Assistance for the entire life-cycle...



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Main security requirements from China customers:

1. Security knowledge importing
2. Security analysis and solution definition
3. Security process compliance
4. Security component development and introduction
5. Security testing
6. Backend security solution

ESCRYPT – System Provider

ESCRYPT solutions:

1. Security knowledge importing

Organizational trainings:

1. Fundamentals of Security Engineering and SDL
2. Security trends and attack
3. Establishing security for components and systems based on cryptography
4. Requirements for developing secure embedded systems
5. Secure system design and secure architecture

Professional trainings:

1. Introduction to cryptography and IT-security
2. Automotive HSM (Hardware Security Module)
3. SHE (Secure Hardware Extensions)
4. Key management system
5. Flash over the air

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Security training list

Day 1 Automotive Security Basics		Day 3 Trends & Automotive Security, Software	
AM	Fundamentals of Security Engineering and SDL / Holistic security Design of Systems	AM	Trends & Attacks
PM	Introduction to cryptography	AM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Automotive security: threats and trends State-of-the-Art in Automotive Hacking
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Symmetric key cryptography Hash functions 		PM
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public key cryptography Certificates and PKI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secure Diagnostic Interface Secure in-vehicle communication 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security Certification Introduction to security in the IT industry 		
	Day 2 Secure System Design and Secure Architecture		Day 4 Automotive Security, Hardware
AM	Secure Design Lifecycle 1	AM	Introduction to Automotive HSMs and the Bosch HSM
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> System Modeling Security Objectives and Threat Analysis Risk Assessment Security Requirements Security Concept 	PM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secure Hardware Extension, SHE and SHE+ Application SW integration, CycurHSM & AUTOSAR CSM
Day 5 Firewall, Software updates & Connectivity			
PM	Secure Design Lifecycle 2	AM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Application SW integration, CycurHSM & AUTOSAR CSM cont.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security testing Test Tools for Security functionality Security Evaluation Supplier Audit 	PM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Software Updates over-the-air Key management Connectivity Car-to-car communications

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
ESCRYPT solutions:

2. Security analysis and solution definition

- Provided E/E architecture consulting
- Analyzed the network planned by the OEM
- Security threat and risk analysis
- Security concept development
- Proposed improvements
- Proposed firewall rules

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Security threat and risk analysis (Security asset and Attack tree)



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Security threat and risk analysis (Risk assessment)

AP↓	Probability reference	Risk assessment			
Basic	Certain	Undesirable	Inacceptable	Inacceptable	Inacceptable
Enhanced Basic	Likely	Tolerable	Undesirable	Inacceptable	Inacceptable
Moderate	Possibly	Tolerable	Undesirable	Undesirable	Inacceptable
High	Unlikely	Negligible	Tolerable	Undesirable	Undesirable
Beyond High	Rare	Negligible	Negligible	Tolerable	Tolerable
	Practically infeasible	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible
DP →		Insignificant	Medium	Critical	Catastrophic

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Security thread and risk analysis

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Security mechanism list for reference

1. Secure boot loader
2. Digital signature for key data
3. MAC protection for CAN message
4. HSM protection (or trust zone solution)
5. Key Management solution
6. Cryptography
7. Access control
8. Memory protection
9. Debugger interface and backdoor...


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4. Security process compliance

- Security Engineering Process detailed deployment consulting
- Security process tailoring
- Security activity support
- Security gateway review
- Security audit support

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
Security thread and risk analysis (Overview)










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ESCRYPT solutions:

5. Security component development and introduction



 <p>CycurLIB Cryptographic library for embedded Systems</p>	 <p>CycurTLS Transport Layer Security (TLS) for embedded platforms</p>	 <p>CycurACT Secure feature activation for embedded devices</p>	 <p>CycurFLASH Secure flashing solution for embedded devices</p>
 <p>CycurV2X The IEEE 1609.2 ETSI TS 103 097 security stack</p>	 <p>CycurKEYS Cryptographic key management server for secure management of embedded applications</p>	 <p>CycurHSM Automotive-qualified software stack for Hardware Security Modules</p>	

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ESCRYPT solutions:


6. Security penetration testing

In order to improve quality, trust, and dependability of such an embedded system, usually additional test methods that are designed **from an attacker's point of view** are needed since:

- Practical implementation can deviate from specification
- Fatal implementation errors can lead to security weaknesses
- Physical implementation can introduce additional security risks

Security penetration test can be:

- Component level
- Domain level
- Vehicle level




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ESCRYPT solutions:

7. Backend security solution

- Key management solution(KMS) for OEMs and Tire1s
- Flash over the air (FOTA)



Partners

BOSCH
Invented for life

Red Bend
Software

arynqa

Innovators and leaders in the development of software lifecycle management technologies.

escrypt

**Thank you for
your kind attention!**

